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The paper analyzes the e￿ects of liberalization in increasing returns to scale industries. It
studies the optimal regulation of an incumbent competing with an unregulated strategic
competitor, when public funds are costly. The model shows a trade o￿ between productive
and allocative e￿ciency. Moreover, the welfare gains of liberalization, as compared with
regulated monopoly, are a non monotonic function of the cost of public funds. Finally, in the
case of severe cash constraint of the government, incomplete regulation may also dominate
full regulation of duopoly.
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11 Introduction
Over the last 25 years many regulated markets have been reformed, both in developed and de-
veloping countries. Technological changes and the growing dissatisfaction with the performance
of regulated monopolies led to the introduction of pro-competitive reforms. We refer to this
process of market opening as to liberalization 1 and, in this context, the present paper studies
the optimal regulation of an incumbent exposed to unregulated competition. This is particularly
relevant in the contexts of regional integration such as the European Union, where the EC legis-
lation prescribes progressive opening to competition of formerly regulated monopolies. Similarly,
other regions promote market integration in regulated markets (examples are the experiences of
energy market integration in Latin America, East-Asia, West and South Africa). An important
feature of these markets is that, due to residual increasing returns to scale and incumbency
advantage, they tend to remain concentrated and the national leaders stay dominant. For this
reason, regulation is needed even after liberalization. Often this regulation is incomplete (or
asymmetric): the regulator directly in￿uences the operations of the incumbent, while competi-
tors are less regulated (or unregulated). This can arise for many reasons. In many cases the
incumbent is subject to additional requirements to correct for the consequences of market power
(this is common in both electricity and telecommunication markets) or because it is the universal
service provider (universal service obligations are usually contracted with incumbent ￿rms on a
long term basis). In addition, incomplete regulation may emerge because regulators are not able
to extend an e￿ective regulatory control on large multinational ￿rms (especially in developing
countries). Finally, incomplete market regulation may depend on the fact that regulated ￿rms
are exposed to competition from unregulated producers adopting alternative technologies. For
instance, trains and trucks compete in freight transportation and the truck industry is usually
unregulated while railways are heavily regulated. Similarly, high speed railways compete on some
routes with airlines (which are subject to lighter regulation). In telecommunications, the heavily
regulated ￿xed lines operators are increasingly exposed to competition from mobiles and internet
services.
Several empirical studies have tried to measure the impact of increasing competition in regulated
markets. Most of them agree that an increase in competition induces an increase in e￿ciency
(see for instance the cross-country analysis of Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000 for telecommunica-
tions, Pollit, 1995 for electricity, and the studies of Wilson, 1997 and Pollit and Smith, 2001 for
railways in the US and UK respectively). The impact of competition on prices is by far less clear.
The results are mixed and debated. Hausman, Leonard, and Sidak (2002) analyzing the entry
of the Bell Companies in the US long distance telecommunication market, ￿nd that increased
competition has been associated with a decrease of the per minute price but an increase in the
monthly fee (with the net e￿ect of reducing the annual bill of the average consumer). In the
case of electricity, the empirical evidence does not support the idea the liberalization is associ-
ated with decreasing prices. There are some positive results (Steiner, 2001) and many negative
(Green and Newbery in Helm and Jenkinson, 1998, Domah and Pollit, 2001, Zhang, Parker, and
Kirkpatrick, 2002, Hattori and Tsutsui, 2003). Summarizing, pro competitive reforms increase
e￿ciency but do not necessary translate into lower prices. The broad welfare consequences of
these reforms are easy to understand.
1In contrast, the reforms involving a change of ownership are referred to as privatization. The question of
ownership, which has been widely studied in the literature, is not explicitly considered here. For surveys of the
theoretical and empirical contributions on the topic, see for instance Shleifer (1998) and Meggison and Netter
(2001).
2In what follows we study the e￿ects of liberalization in an incomplete regulation framework. The
regulator controls the production of the regulated ￿rm and sets a regulatory instrument (tax or
transfer), but public funds are costly. In this context, the shadow cost of public funds plays an
important role, because it is related to the weight put on the incumbent’s pro￿t in the social
welfare function. Indeed, the chosen modeling strategy is a way to capture in a reduced form
the idea that the operating pro￿ts of the regulated incumbent are socially valuable, because they
help to reduce distortive taxation.2 Consistent with the empirical evidence, we ￿nd that the
introduction of competition does not always decrease prices. More precisely, we identify a trade
o￿ between productive and allocative e￿ciency. When asymmetric information is added to the
picture, the presence of an unregulated competitor has an additional value because it helps to re-
duce the information rent captured by the regulated ￿rm: we explore this possibility introducing
yardstick competition. The theoretical bene￿ts of yardstick competition have been analyzed in
the literature starting with the work of Shleifer (1985). In recent years, regulators have started
applying several form of benchmarking, inspired by this theoretical literature. For instance,
yardstick competition have been applied to hospital regulation in many countries, following the
example of the American Medicare system. Moreover, yardstick competition has been used for
regulating buses in Norway and water utilities in the UK. Our model shows how the presence
of unregulated competitors may help to regulate regulated producers. Although this has not
received a lot of attention, some evidence of this possibility has been documented empirically in
Bhaskar, Gupta, and Khan (2006), analyzing the yardstick e￿ect of partial privatization of the
Bangladesh jute sector.
Introducing yardstick competition in an incomplete regulation framework, we show a non-
monotonic relationship between the welfare gains of liberalization and the cost of public funds.
We also show that these welfare gains are robust and do not depend crucially on the chosen
market structure. In particular, under asymmetric information, partial regulation may dominate
full regulation of duopoly. This occurs in case of severe cash constraint of the government.
1.1 Relationship with the literature
The virtues of the two pure models of monopoly regulation and perfect competition are well
understood. However, the conditions under which regulated supply is preferable to unregulated
competition in concentrated markets are less clear (see Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). In
particular, as Armstrong and Sappington (2005) observe, unfettered competition can complicate
regulatory policy by undermining preferred pricing structures (i.e. taxation by regulation). The
public ￿nance aspect of deregulation is analyzed in Auriol and Picard (2007), who compare
full regulation of monopoly to full privatization (which is equivalent to laissez-faire in their
context). They show how the public budget conditions of countries can in￿uence the optimal
privatization policy. Our paper shows that the ￿scal aspect of monopoly regulation matters
not only when considering privatization, but also liberalization. Other works have introduced
competition in regulated markets, often adapting the classical regulation model of Baron and
Myerson (1982). One possible approach is to assume that the entire industry is regulated, like
2For simplicity, you can think of the revenue of a public or mixed incumbent. However model is also consistent
with the imposition of taxes on the rents made by private ￿rms. Indeed, incumbents are often vertically and/or
horizontally integrated with ￿rms operating in non-competitive segments and their operating pro￿ts may help
to cross subsidize non-competitive activities (e.g. infrastructure investment and universal service obligations). A
reduction of the incumbent’s pro￿t may thus undermine taxation by regulation. More in general, governments
can can tax more easily domestic ￿rms than foreign ones. Rents extraction does not apply to the same extent to
domestic and foreign ￿rms because the latter do not report most of their pro￿ts locally.
3in the duopoly model of Auriol and La￿ont (1993). Closer to the kind of situation we have in
mind (regulated ￿rm vs unregulated competitors), La￿ont and Tirole (1993) look at the case
of a multi-product regulated monopoly exposed to a competitive fringe. They show that, when
competition is responsible for an increase in variety, the optimal pricing rule can be higher than
the monopoly Ramsey benchmark.3 De Fraja (1997) extends the analysis to the case in which
the unregulated competitor has an (unknown) entry cost, with similar results on this point.
Caillaud (1990) considers competition between a dominant regulated ￿rm and an unregulated
fringe under asymmetric information and cost correlation. He shows that competition has a
positive e￿ect on overall e￿ciency and helps to reduce the rent of the regulated ￿rm. However,
the welfare maximizing behavior of the regulator produces a non-standard optimization problem,
which admits a complete characterization only in the limiting cases of perfect correlation and
full independence of marginal costs.4 In the present paper, we introduce yardstick competition,
using a stochastic structure inspired by Auriol and La￿ont (1993). This allows to study in a
tractable way the impact of an unregulated competition on prices and welfare in the realistic
case of partial cost correlation.
Most of existing literature considers a non-strategic competitive fringe. However, this assumption
does not ￿t particularly well oligopolistic industries. One noticeable exception is the work of
Biglaiser and Ma (1995), who build a model of horizontal and vertical di￿erentiation, in which
consumers have an exogenous preference for the variety produced by the monopolist. They ￿nd
that competition helps to extract the rent of the regulated ￿rm, but allocative ine￿ciency arises
in equilibrium. In the present paper, we consider both the impact of competition on productive
and allocative e￿ciency, when ￿rms have asymmetric information about their production cost.
We also introduce a shadow cost of public funds, which allows to study the e￿ect of competition
on taxpayers.
In a similar framework, Aubert and Pouyet (2004, 2006) consider the possibility of collusion in
an incomplete regulation framework. They show that in some cases the regulator might not be
willing to ￿ght collusive agreements.5 Collusion and the optimal enforcement of competition
policy are out of the scope of the present paper. We concentrate instead on the broad welfare
consequences of the trade o￿ between the loss of control on part of the industry and the e￿ciency
enhancing value of competition. We refer to their work for antitrust issues and related distortions,
which would not change the main insights of our paper (see discussions in Sections 4 and 5).
Our results are also reminiscent of the literature on mixed markets (Beato and Mas-Colell, 1984,
Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse, 1989, 1991, De Fraja and Delbono,
1989). These papers look at markets with public and private participants. In particular, Cremer,
Marchand and Thisse argue that a mixed market can be preferred to both full privatization
and full nationalization. This depends on the assumption that public ￿rms are pure welfare
3In an oligopolistic context, this e￿ect does not crucially depend on the presence of partial substitution. It
also arises in our model, though we do not make the assumption that competition is responsible for an increase
in variety. Indeed, if it was the case, it should be explained why the monopoly did not produced more varieties
in the ￿rst place. We show that in an oligopolistic context an increase in the Ramsey markup can come from a
rather di￿erent source: the trade o￿ between productive and allocative e￿ciency.
4Similarly, Boyer and La￿ont (2003), analyzing the e￿ect of competition on the power of incentives in a
regulated industry, limit their analysis to the case of independence of marginal costs, even though in regulated
industries the costs of the di￿erent operators are generally correlated.
5Instead, Tangeras (2002) introduces collusion under yardstick competition in a complete regulation framework
￿ la Auriol and La￿ont (1993). He shows that collusion arises only if ￿rms can commit to side payments. In this
case, the collusion proof contract introduces an additional distortion which partly reduces the bene￿ts of yardstick
competition.
4maximizers, but have the disadvantage of paying an exogenous wage premium to workers. In our
framework, this exogenous cost disadvantage is replaced by the endogenous rent seeking behavior
of the regulated ￿rm, which makes regulation socially onerous.
1.2 Plan of the paper
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is presented. Section 3 and 4
treat the cases of symmetric and asymmetric information respectively. Optimal price, quantities
and market structure are described. For performing comparative statics, the solution is fully
characterized for the case of linear demand and uniform distribution. Section 5 presents the
welfare analysis, comparing regulated monopoly to liberalization. Section 6 considers the issue
of excess entry. Section 7 compares incomplete regulation to full duopoly regulation. Section 8
concludes.
2 The model
There are two ￿rms, identi￿ed by 1 and 2. Firm 1 denotes the incumbent. Its quantity is
determined by a regulator6, who also sets a regulatory instrument  (tax or transfer). Firm 2,
the entrant, is a fully unregulated private competitor. As such, it takes full accountability of its
pro￿ts and losses. For simplicity, one can think of the case in which the national ￿rm is public
or mixed. Even in the case of privatized ￿rms, asymmetric regulation is a relevant framework in
many liberalized market, as explained in Section 1.
The regulator acts as a Stackelgerg leader through the quantity produced by Firm 1. Firm 2 is a
Stackelberg follower. It maximizes pro￿t choosing quantity q2 after q1 is determined.7 The cost
functions of the two ￿rms take the form:
Ci(qi) = iqi + k
where the index i 2 f1;2g indicates the two ￿rms, i is the constant marginal cost of ￿rm i
and k the ￿xed cost.8 Marginal costs i are common knowledge in the symmetric information
case and private information of the ￿rms in the asymmetric information one. We assume that
the ￿xed cost k has to be spent before 1 and 2 are discovered. The pro￿ts of the two ￿rms
write:
1 = P(Q)q1   1q1   k   ;
2 = P(Q)q2   2q2   k;
6One may argue that it is much more common to regulate prices than quantities. Indeed, quantity competition
allows to concentrate on the direct impact of competition in concentrated market, without incurring in Bertrand-
type paradoxes. However, a model of price competition with closely substitute goods would deliver the same
qualitative predictions, especially concerning the welfare impact of liberalization.
7One important simpli￿cation of this model is that vertical issues (control of bottleneck facilities by the
incumbent) are neglected. This can represent the case in which the entrant can bypass the infrastructure of the
incumbent. Alternatively, one can think of industries in which there is vertical unbundling (or at least formal
separation) and access is priced at marginal cost.
8We could assume that the ￿xed costs are di￿erent between ￿rms. In this case, the cost of the competitor
would explicitly represent the level of duplication of ￿xed costs and possibly include and entry cost. This would
not alter the nature of the results.
5 represents the regulatory instrument. It is a tax on pro￿t when positive and a transfer
when negative. r2(q1) is the reaction function of ￿rm 2, i.e. r2(q1) = argmaxq2 2. We assume
that public funds have a positive opportunity cost, namely , deriving, for example, from the
need to raise taxes through distortive taxation. On the contrary. The pro￿t of Firm 2 cannot
be taxed away.9 The social welfare function takes the form:
W = S(Q)   P(Q)Q + (1 + ) + 1 + 2 (1)
where S(Q) is gross consumer welfare and Q = q1 + q2 is the total quantity. The de￿nition
given in Equation (1) implies that the pro￿ts of both ￿rms enter the social welfare function.
This would be the case if we consider two national ￿rms. Alternatively, we can think of a foreign
￿rm which participation brings some welfare gains to the host country (for instance because it
creates employment). This speci￿cation has the advantage of allowing easy comparisons of our
results with the existing literature on liberalization. However it is not crucial for the nature of
the results. An alternative version of the model without the pro￿t of Firm 2 in the social welfare
function gives the same qualitative results.
We start considering the case in which both ￿rms have entered the market. The decision of entry
is studied in more detail in Section 6.
3 Symmetric information
In the benchmark case of symmetric information, the regulator observes both the variable costs
1 and 2. The regulator maximizes social welfare (1) with respect to q1 and , under the
participation constraint of the regulated ￿rm and the reaction function of the competitor. 10 The
participation constraint takes the form:
1 = P(Q)q1   1q1   k     0 (2)
This constraint is binding at optimum and the social welfare can be written:
WSI = S(Q)   1q1   2q2 + (P(Q)   1)q1   (2 + )k (3)
Equation (3) makes it apparent how the existence of a cost of public funds puts a higher
weight on the operating pro￿t of Firm 1. The regulator maximizes (3) with respect to q1 under
the constraints:
q2 = r2(q1) (4)
q1  0 (5)
q2  0 (6)
(7)
9This is a simpli￿cation to describe the empirically relevant case where national ￿rms are more easily taxed
than foreign competitors.
10As in the mixed market framework, the regulator uses its control on the regulated ￿rm to maximize welfare.
However, contrarily to the mixed market case, we do not assume a hard budget constraint between the regulated
￿rm and the government (i.e. average cost pricing). When  is positive, the operating pro￿t of the ￿rm can help
to reduce distortive taxation and increase economy welfare.
6Constraint (4) states that the competitor follows a (Cournot) best response function. Con-
straints (5) and (6) are the non-negativity constraints on the produced quantities. For solving
the regulator’s problem, we make the following Assumption:
Assumption 1 WSI is a continuous twice di￿erentiable function of q1. The second order con-
dition @2WSI=@q2
1  0 is satis￿ed and the regulator’s problem is concave. 11
Let P(q
M;SI
1 ) the regulated monopoly price under asymmetric information (Ramsey bench-
mark) and P(qM
2 ) the private monopoly price charged by Firm 2 when Firm 1 does not produce.




Q). The solution of the regulator’s program is
characterized by the following Proposition.
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= 0. Under Assumption 1, the price







1 ); if (1;2) 2 M;















2(q1); if (1;2) 2 D;
P(qM
2 ); if (1;2) 2 M2.
where:
M = f(1;2) j qS
1 > 0;P(q
M;SI
1 )  2g
M1 = f(1;2) j qS
1 > 0;P(qS
1 )  2 < P(q
M;SI
1 )g
D = f(1;2) j qS
1 > 0;P(qS
1 ) > 2g
M2 = f(1;2) j qS
1  0g
Proof See Appendix 1.
Price and market structure depend on the level of 2, and more precisely on relative e￿ciency
of the competitor with respect to the incumbent. They change in the di￿erent sub-regions
(namely M, M1, D and M2). We now discuss the characteristics of the di￿erent regions.
Region M:
In the region denoted by M, the price is equal to the one which would be chosen the in case
of regulated monopoly. Firm 2 does not produce and there is a monopoly with Firm 1 even if
Firm 2 is allowed to produce. In this case, removing barriers to entry does not change the market
outcome. The potential entrant turns out to be too ine￿cient to participate.
Region M1:
In region M1, the price is equal to 2. We are in a region in which Firm 2 would produce
if the price was equal to P(qM
1 ) but does not do it under duopoly pricing. In this region, the
pricing rule keeps out the competitor. This ￿limit pricing￿ behavior di￿ers from other results in
the literature, which emphasize the risk of predation by a regulated incumbent. 12 In our case,
11It can be easily veri￿ed this assumption always hold if the demand function is concave and the reaction
function of ￿rm 2 has the standard Cournot-Stackelberg properties.
12For instance, Faure-Grimaud (1997), considering a regulated ￿rm, shows that, in a dynamic framework, the
rent of the regulated ￿rm decreases with the number of competitors. For this reason a regulated ￿rm has an
incentive to foreclose rivals. Similarly, Sappington and Sidak (1994), considering the particular case of state
owned enterprizes, argue that the anticompetitive behavior can be reinforced with respect to the case of private
pro￿t maximizers.
7the outcome depends on the behavior of the regulator, which acts as a pure welfare maximizer.
Notice that this region exists only when  > 0.13 In this case, the regulated monopoly price
would be higher than marginal cost pricing. The price reduction under duopoly aims then to
discourage ine￿cient entry.
Region D:
In Region D both ￿rms are active: the market is a true duopoly. In this case, the price is given
by a modi￿ed Ramsey rule. It is easy to verify that the price is always higher than the marginal
cost of Firm 1, because both the second and the third term in the price formula are positive. The
second term corresponds to the usual Ramsey term, but it is here multiplied by the elasticity of









Q < 1). The
Ramsey term is thus reduced with respect to the traditional regulated monopoly case. The third
term is an additional term which is positive for all prices such that the second ￿rm produces
a positive quantity (i.e. P(Q)  2). This term increases the Lerner index with respect to
the regulated monopoly case. When the quantity produced by Firm 1 is reduced to leave space
to the more e￿cient competitor, the increase in the quantity produced by the latter is small.
This terms captures the trade o￿ between producing at lower cost (i.e. letting a greater market
share to an oligopolistic ￿rm) and reducing the price. This e￿ect is described more formally in
Proposition 2.
Region M2:
The last region to consider is the one denoted M2, where the optimal quantity produced by
Firm is equal to zero. In this case, Firm 2 produces its monopoly quantity and it is the only
￿rm on the market. The regulator prefers to shut down the regulated ￿rm and let the private
competitor take over.
3.1 Linear demand
We now take a linear speci￿cation of the demand function, which allows to explicitly compute
the price and quantities and to compare them with the regulated monopoly ones.
Assumption 2 The (inverse) demand function is P(Q) = 1   Q.
The linear demand function is associated with a consumer surplus of the form: S(Q) =




(1   q1   2)
Under Assumption 2, the quantities and price can be expressed as a function of the marginal
costs and  (see Appendix 1 for details). This allows to explicitly compare the duopoly quantities
and price with the ones obtained under regulated monopoly. Developing computations, we
obtain the following result, which illustrates the trade o￿ described in the discussion following
Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Let QD;SI be the duopoly quantity produced for 1;2 2 D. Under Assumption
2 the following holds:
13When  = 0, P
M;SI
1 corresponds to the marginal cost 1. Then region M1 would be such that P(q
D
1 )  2 < 1.
However, from the implicit de￿nition of q
D
1 , one can easily verify that, for  = 0, P(q
D
1 )  1 if and only if 2 > 1.
Therefore, for  = 0, there is no pair f1;2g which satis￿es the de￿nition of region D.
8 If  > 1, P(QD;SI) < P(qM
1 ), 81;2 2 D;
 If   1, P(QD;SI)  P(qM
1 ) if and only if:
2  1  
22(1   1)
(1 + 2)(1   )
(8)
For the empirically more relevant case (  1)14, there is a trade o￿ between productive and
allocative e￿ciency. A price decrease does not depend on the fact that the relative e￿ciency of
the entrant is large (i.e. 2  1), but it tends to occur when Firm 2 is not too e￿cient. In
this case, the regulator expands the quantity produced by Firm 1 in order to reduce the scale of
entry of the unregulated ￿rm. This increases the total quantity and reduces the price. On the
contrary, a decrease in the average cost of production is not systematically transmitted to the
price. When Firm 2 is relatively e￿cient, the price tends to increase with respect to monopoly,
because the reduction in the quantity produced by the regulated ￿rm is not fully compensated
by the production of Firm 2.
4 Asymmetric information
We now turn to the case of asymmetric information. We assume that production costs are
private information of the ￿rms, but their distribution is common knowledge. Under asymmetric
information, the regulator has to leave a rent to the regulated ￿rm to extract the information
about the realization of the marginal cost. However, the regulator observes the market ￿nal price
and/or quantity. This gives some information about the level of 2 (and thus, in the presence of
correlation, about 1). The regulator can use this information to perform yardstick competition.
As CrØmer and Mc Lean (1988) show, under some conditions partial correlation can be su￿cient
to allow a principal to fully extract the surplus in an asymmetric information problem. However,
it seems reasonable to assume that in practice yardstick competition reduces the agency cost of
asymmetric information without making it vanish. To convey this idea, we take a speci￿cation
which is inspired by Auriol and La￿ont (1993). We assume that the marginal costs of the two
￿rms have the shape i =  + "i, where  is the common part of marginal costs and "i is
an idiosyncratic shock with zero mean. The correlation between the costs of the two ￿rms is
captured by the common parameter , which represents the average cost in the industry, that
is E(i) = . Firms sustain some common production cost (e.g. same cost of inputs, similar
technologies), but they are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which determine the relative e￿ciency
of the di￿erent providers. This speci￿cation does not respect the assumption of the CrØmer and
Mc Lean (1988) theorem and the full extraction property does not hold. However, contrarily to
more general speci￿cations (see Caillaud, 1990 on this point), it allows to capture in a tractable
way the impact of imperfect cost correlation. For the analytical solution of the model, we thus
precise this stochastic structure as follows:
Assumption 3 Let the marginal cost be of the form i = +"i.  is a discrete random variable
which takes values  or  with Prob( = ) = . " is a continuous variable with distribution on
the support [";"]. Moreover,  + " =  + " = z.
14This threshold does not depend on imposing P(Q) = 1   Q. The same threshold holds for all linear demand
speci￿cations of the kind P(Q) = d   bQ.
9This speci￿cation is simply a way to assume that the marginal costs are both distributed
either on the support Z1 = [;z] or on Z2 = [z;], with  < z < . It is never the case that
i 2 Z1 and j 2 Z2, i 6= j (either the two costs are ￿low￿ or they are both ￿high￿). For simplicity,
we assume that the two possible intervals do not overlap.
The contract is now contingent on the realization of q2. Since the competitor is a Stackelberg
follower, its quantity is observed after Firm 1 produces q1. We assume that the regulator is able
to commit to punish the manager of Firm 1 after q2 has been observed, in case the deduced
2 is inconsistent with the report on 1. This notion of punishment has not to be confused
with the fact that the rationality constraint of the ￿rm is always satis￿ed (Firm 1 never makes
accidental losses). This does not exclude that managers can be persecuted and/or replaced for
fraudulent behavior. We consider a direct revelation mechanism in which Firm 1 reports its
cost and the regulator o￿ers a menu of contracts [q1(1);(1;q2)] for each possible type 1 (the
revelation principle ensures that there is no loss of generality in restricting the attention to direct
revelation mechanisms). With the stochastic structure described in Assumption 3, @F(2j1)=@1
is zero almost everywhere (i.e. except if 1 = z). A marginal variation of 1 does not change
Firm’s 1 conditional expectation on Firm’s 2 characteristic (except in one case which occurs with
probability zero). We denote (1) = E2j11(1;2) the expected pro￿t of Firm 1. Yardstick
competition ensures that the rent is paid only on the relevant interval of 1 and types 1 = 1 and
1 = z get zero rent.15 The information rent can be computed following the by now standard




















where IZ2 is the indicator function of 1 falling in region Z2, which means:
IZ2 =

1; if 1 2 Z2;
0; otherwise.
From Equation (9), we see that the slope is reduced with respect to the monopoly case in
which the rent is proportional to the full hazard rate:16
15This rent reducing e￿ect on the rent is di￿erent with respect to the correlation e￿ect studied in Caillaud
(1990) and afterwards in the literature on strategic trade policy (see Brainard and Martimort, 1996, 1997 and
Combes, Caillaud, and Jullien, 1997). In all these cases, the rent seeking behavior of the regulated ￿rm is
modi￿ed by competition through the term @F(2j1)=@1. In our case @F(2j1)=@1 = 0 almost everywhere, but
the yardstick e￿ect cuts down the rent of the regulated ￿rm. Our speci￿cation avoids technical di￿culties and
allows to characterize the e￿ect of partial correlation on the optimal contract, relying on the realistic hypothesis
that yardstick competition is used to reduce the agency cost of asymmetric information.
16In the case of shut down of Firm 2, the regulator cannot deduce the exact value of 2. Nevertheless, this does








We make the following standard assumption:
Assumption 4 The hazard rate F(1)=f(1) is non-decreasing for all 1.
The regulator chooses q1 without observing 2, maximizing expected welfare. Replacing for
the value of the rent (in order to satisfy the incentive constraint of truthful revelation), we have:
WAI = E1;2 S(Q) + P(Q)q1   (1 + )(1q1 + k)   2q2   
F(1)   IZ2(1)F(z)
f(1)
q1   k (11)
The solution of the problem gives a rule on the expected price, which is characterized in the
following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Let qA






= 0. Under Assumption 1 and 4, in




















; if (1;2) 2 M1 [ D;
E2j1P(qM
2 ); if (1;2) 2 M2.
where:
M1 [ D = f(1;2) j qA
1 > 0 }
M2 = f(1;2) j qA
1  0g
and v
1 is the virtual cost including the distortion related to the information rent:
v




Proof See Appendix 2.
As in the case of symmetric information, the quantities and price are di￿erent in di￿erent
regions, depending on cost realizations.
Region M1 [ D:
In this region Firm 1 produces a positive quantity. Because the 2 is not observed, the quantity
produced by ￿rm 1 is set maximizing expected welfare, while the realized market structure
depends on the realization of 2. There can be a monopoly with ￿rm 1 if q2 = 0 (region M1) or
a duopoly (region D). In region D the pricing rule has the same form as in Proposition 1, except
that it is a rule on the expected price. Moreover, the cost 1 is replaced by the virtual cost v
1.
Region M2:
In region M2, the quantity produced by Firm 1 is equal to zero. In this case, Firm 2 produces
its monopoly quantity and the price.
whenever the regulated ￿rm is lying across intervals, Firm 2 produces a positive quantity, revealing the relevant
subinterval of the variable costs. For instance, one can easily show that this always holds under Assumptions 2
and 5. At the optimal menu of contracts, q2(q1j1 2 Z1; ^ 1 2 Z2) > 0, 81;2 2 Z1.
114.1 Linear demand
As in Section 3.1, we now completely characterize the solution for the case of linear demand in
Assumption 2. Moreover, we precise the stochastic structure of Assumption 3 as follows:
Assumption 5 Let Assumption 3 hold and:
 2 f1
4; 3
4g ; Probf = 1
4g = 1
2 ; "  U[ 1
4; 1
4]
In this case, i is uniformly distributed either on Z1 = [0; 1
2] (with probability 1
2) or on Z2 = [1
2;1].
Moreover, z = 1
2. We thus have E("i) = 0, E(i) = E() = 1
2.
Under Assumption 2 and 5, the regions implicitly characterized in Proposition 3 can be
explicitly expressed in terms of the e￿ciency parameters 1 and 2. They are illustrated in
Figure 1.17
Figure 1: Market structure with asymmetric information.
























Due to Assumption 5, the two marginal costs fall either in the North-East or in the South-
West regions. Region M1 corresponds to the case in which the relative ine￿ciency of the entrant
is very high (1  2) and no entry occurs. In Region D, both ￿rms produce. The pricing
rule, described in Proposition 3, in the case of linear demand become equivalent to the one
given in Proposition 1, replacing 2 with its expectation and 1 with the virtual cost v
1. Then,
the qualitative results of Proposition 1 are preserved. More precisely, it can be shown that the
expected price decreases more when the expected relative e￿ciency of Firm 2 is not too large.
However, because of yardstick competition, the price is closer to e￿ciency. The virtual cost
of production is smaller than in the case of regulated monopoly, i.e. 1 + 
1+
F(1)




f(1) . For this reason, the price decreases more often than in the case of complete
17The ￿gure is plotted for  = 0:3, but the same qualitative shape is obtained for all  > 0.
12information. Yardstick competition, increasing the productive e￿ciency of the regulated ￿rm,
allows to increase the produced quantity at a lower cost. Observing the market behavior of
an unregulated ￿rm provides precious information to the regulator, since this behavior is not
distorted by regulation.18
One may also note that, because 2 is not observable, the shut down rule for Firm 1 depends now
only on 1. There can hence be a monopoly with Firm 2 for each level of 2 (Region M2). This
region of the parameters includes the one in which there would be shut down under monopoly
(and no production in the absence of Firm 2). In this case, a competitor with market power is
valuable with respect to the alternative of not providing the service at all.
5 Welfare analysis
In this section, we compare expected welfare under regulated monopoly and partially regulated
duopoly. First of all, we note that, when  ! 0, transfers are not costly and entry is accomodated
only when it is bene￿cial (i.e. when the competitor is more e￿cient than the entrant). The
expected welfare under duopoly (net of ￿xed costs) would then be larger than under monopoly.
On the contrary, when  ! 1, only the pro￿t of the regulated ￿rm matters. Since the monopoly
pro￿t is always larger than the Stackelberg one, the welfare gains associated with competition
go to  1 when  ! 1. For intermediate values of , the business stealing e￿ect of competition
decreases the size of the tax (increase the size of transfers). This has a negative impact on
welfare. In the case of asymmetric information, the negative ￿scal e￿ect is mitigated by the fact
that the presence of a competitor allows to reduce the information rent of the incumbent. In
order to characterize more precisely what happens for intermediate values of , we use again
the linear speci￿cation proposed in Assumption 2. This allows to compute explicitly the welfare




i the duopoly quantity produced under symmetric information by Firm i, i 2













1   (1 + )k]
WD;SI = E1;2[QD;SI  
(QD;SI)2
2
  1q1   2q2 + (1   QD;SI   1)q
D;SI
1   (2 + )k]
We deduce that under symmetric information, duopoly is preferred to monopoly whenever
WD;SI   WM;SI  0. This determines a threshold value of k, characterized by the following
Proposition.
18Naturally, this also depends on the fact that we rule out the possibility of collusion between the incumbent
and the entrant. Aubert and Pouyet (2006) show that in a incomplete regulation framework, collusion (with
transfers) could be preferred to a collusion proof contract, because it allows the regulator and the incumbent to
￿team up￿ and tax or subsidize the entrant. The possibility of extracting a collusive transfer from the entrant
could reduce the negative impact of business stealing. On the other hand, if ￿rms collude, the e￿ectiveness of
yardstick competition might be reduced (see also Pouyet, 2002). Qualitatively, the main insights of our paper
would carry on.
13Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 2 and 5 hold. In the case of symmetric information, we have
two cases:
1. For   1:1, there exists a threshold kSI such that liberalization dominates partially reg-
ulated monopoly for k  kSI. Moreover, kSI increases in a small neighborhood of  = 0.
Afterwards, it is decreasing.
2. For  > 1:1 regulated monopoly always dominates partially regulated monopoly.
Proof See Appendix 3.
When  increases, the pro￿t of the regulated ￿rm becomes valuable and the business stealing
e￿ect starts making entry less desirable.19 When  is high ( > 1:1), a regulated monopoly
is preferred to liberalization for all levels of the increasing returns to scale (this range of 
can describe severely constrained governments, such as the ones of many developing countries).
For lower values, the desirability of incomplete regulation, as compared to monopoly, generally
decreases with the value of  (except in a small neighborhood of zero,   0:0001). The results
of this section are in line with the common view that competition can be welfare increasing if the
economies of scale are not very large. However, we have shown that there is another important
condition: the cost of public funds has to be not too large either. For the same level of economies
of scales, countries with di￿erent cost of public funds would optimally choose di￿erent industrial




i the duopoly quantity produced under asymmetric information by Firm i,
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Under asymmetric information, duopoly is preferred to monopoly whenever WD;AI WM;AI 
0. This determines a threshold value of k, characterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Let Assumptions 2 and 5 hold. In the case of asymmetric information, we have
two cases:
19This welfare result does not crucially depend on the duopoly structure. Indeed, Aubert and Pouyet (2004)
show that, when a regulated incumbent is exposed to a competitive fringe, welfare can be higher when the fringe
collude (behaving as a duopolistic competitor) rather than behave competitively. A similar e￿ect is playing here:
introducing competition does not necessarily increase welfare when  is high. However, with more competitors,
the sampling e￿ect (i.e. the probability of ￿nding more e￿cient producers) would also be larger (Aubert and
Pouyet, 2004 concentrate only on the case of identical costs).
141. For   3:7, there exists a threshold kAI such that partially regulated duopoly dominates
regulated monopoly for k  kAI; The threshold kAI has an inverse U-shape.
2. For  > 3:7 regulated monopoly always dominates partially regulated duopoly.
Proof See Appendix 3.
In the case of asymmetric information, regulated monopoly always (i.e. independently on the
level of economies of scale) dominates incomplete regulation only if  is very large (values larger
than 3 are usually considered not empirically relevant). For lower values, the threshold kAI has
an inverse U shape. In Figure 2, kAI (solid line) is compared with kSI (dotted line).
Figure 2: The thresholds kSI and kAI





















For any value of  signi￿catively di￿erent from 0 (more precisely,   0:05)20, partial regula-
tion is preferred to monopoly for higher values of k than in the case of symmetric information. In
other words, for   0:05 asymmetric information favors duopoly. Once again, di￿erent countries
have di￿erent optimal industry structure, for the same level of increasing returns to scale. For
instance, in our speci￿cation, if k ' 0:03, countries with low cost of public funds prefer keeping
a statutory monopoly, for intermediate values the duopoly structure is preferred and ￿nally for
very large values of  the monopoly structure is again optimal.
Naturally, the precise shape of the curves depends on the assumption made on the support of
the distribution of marginal costs. We have assumed that marginal costs are distributed on sym-
metric subintervals of the interval [0,1]. This maximizes ex-ante technological uncertainty 21 and,
20When  = 0, the rent left to the ￿rm does not a￿ect the expected welfare. In this case, the only di￿erence
between the problem under symmetric and asymmetric information is in the fact that under asymmetric informa-
tion the regulator cannot observe 2 (and chooses on the base of an expectation). If 2 was either observable or
unobservable in both cases (which means that the symmetric/asymmetric information would then only be about
the cost of the regulated ￿rm), the two curves would cross in  = 0.
21The intercept of the demand function is also equal to 1. Then  = 1 is the maximum value that makes
production desirable in a complete information benchmark.
15consequently, the potential gains from yardstick competition (as Equation (10) shows, the rent
reduction depends the support of marginal costs). If the variance of marginal cost was smaller,
the di￿erence between the two thresholds kSI and kAI would be reduced, but their qualitative
shape would not be a￿ected.
6 Excess entry:
Until now, we have supposed that both ￿rms have invested k and entered the market. Indeed,
the regulatory contract satis￿es the ex post participation constraint of Firm 1. Then, Firm 1
is always in the market. We now consider the entry decision of Firm 2. To participate, Firm
2 has to spend k before knowing the realization of the variable costs. We denote kSI
2 and kAI
2
the thresholds of k below which Firm 2 ￿nds privately pro￿table to enter the market under
symmetric and asymmetric information respectively. They are given by the value of the ￿xed
cost below which the expected pro￿t is non negative. We compare these thresholds with kSI and
kAI. The results are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 2 and 5, the level of ￿xed costs under which Firm 2 ￿nds
privately pro￿table to enter the market is higher than the level below which entry is socially
valuable. Excess entry occurs, both under symmetric and asymmetric information.
Proof See Appendix 3.
The results are represented in Figure 3. The shaded regions correspond to values of the
parameters for which excess entry occurs.
Excess entry depends on the fact that Firm 2 does not internalize the impact of entry on
the operating pro￿t of Firm 1 (and on taxpayers). Thus, there are cases in which the regulator
is willing to control entry. It can be formally shown that the problem is less severe in the case
of asymmetric information, as the graph qualitatively shows. In the case of asymmetric infor-
mation, the perceived production cost is the virtual cost (which is lower in the case of duopoly,
because of yardstick competition). Then, e￿ciency gains are larger and the divergence of private
and social gains from entry is less pronounced.
7 Incomplete vs full regulation
Insofar, we have analyzed a partially regulated market, ruling out the possibility that all ￿rms
in the market are subject to the same regulatory scheme. One could think that, at least from a
theoretical point of view, full regulation of the market, when feasible, would always be preferable
to incomplete regulation, unless extending the scope of regulation is costly for some exogenous
reason. It turns out that the welfare gains of liberalization under partial regulation are quite
robust. In what follows, we compare welfare under incomplete regulation with welfare in the
case of full regulation of duopoly. As a full regulation benchmark, we use the model of Auriol
and La￿ont (1993). In their model, the quantities of both ￿rms are regulated and subject to a
lump sum tax/tranfer. Then, the pro￿t of Firm i can be written as:
i = P(Q)qi   iqi   k   i; i 2 f1;2g
16Figure 3: Excess Entry
In our notation, the regulator’s problem is to maximize welfare with respect to q1;q2;1;2:
WR = E1;2 S(Q)   P(Q)Q + 1 + 2 + (1 + )(1 + 2) (12)
Since variable costs are linear, at the optimum only the most e￿cient ￿rm produces and the
pricing rule is given by the traditional regulated monopoly Ramsey pricing. Due to yardstick
competition, under asymmetric information the virtual cost is the same as in Proposition 3 (for








Under symmetric information, full regulation always dominates incomplete regulation. The
intuition is very natural. The regulator commits to cover the ￿xed costs of both ￿rms, but at the
same time she can extract their full operating pro￿t. As a result, she can at least replicate the
results of an unregulated ￿rm. Under asymmetric information, the situation is more complex.
Regulated ￿rms are able to get some information rent and the relevant production cost for the
regulator is the virtual cost v
i  i. Because of this distortion, the regulator cannot extract the
full operating pro￿t. Under full regulation, she induces production at the distorted virtual cost,
while covering both ￿xed costs. On the contrary, under incomplete regulation the unregulated
competitor gets full accountability for its pro￿ts/losses. When  is high, the agency cost of
regulation may overweight its bene￿ts. In this case, there exists a threshold value of  above
17which incomplete regulation dominates full regulation of duopoly. The result is stated formally
in the following proposition for the case of linear demand.
Proposition 7 Let Assumption 2 and 5 hold. Then, in the case of asymmetric information,
partial regulation dominates full duopoly regulation when  and k are su￿ciently large.
Proof See Appendix 3.
Figure 4: Incomplete vs full regulation














In Figure 4 the solid line represents di￿erence between welfare under incomplete and full
regulation when k = kAI
2 , which is the maximum value of ￿xed costs that a private ￿rm is willing
to pay (i.e. the maximum value under which a second ￿rm exists). When k = kAI
2 the ￿savings￿
related to not committing to cover the ￿xed costs of Firm 2 are maximal. However, the same
result could be obtained for any value of k introducing an ex-ante ￿xed fee for the unregulated
competitor (licence fee). The model shows that incomplete regulation can be an interesting
option for governments limited by severe cash constraint. In fact, this conciliates the bene￿ts of
keeping some regulated provision with the advantages of private participation.
8 Conclusion
The paper discusses the impact of opening a regulated monopoly to unregulated competition. It is
a model of liberalization with incomplete regulation: the regulator contracts with the incumbent,
but can only indirectly in￿uence the behavior of the competitor. We have shown a trade o￿
between encouraging the production of a relatively e￿cient competitor (increasing productive
18e￿ciency) and the market power of this competitor (which leads to allocative ine￿ciency). We
show that entry can be associated to an increase in the price when the entrant is more e￿cient
than the incumbent. An increase in e￿ciency is generally associated with an increase in the price
and pro￿ts, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The desirability of introducing this
kind of competition is thus sensible to the weight the regulator puts on consumer surplus. The
cost public funds, determining the weight put on the incumbent’s operating pro￿ts, is shown to
play an important role in the welfare analysis. In particular, the welfare gains of liberalization do
not only depend on the degree of increasing returns to scale (measured by the ￿xed costs), but
also on the magnitude of the cost of public funds. The relationship between the cost of public
funds and the welfare gains associated to liberalization is non-monotone. For the same level of
increasing returns to scales, di￿erent countries can have di￿erent optimal industry structures.
The ￿scal aspects of competition, related to taxation by regulation, should be taken into account
by policy makers. When other forms of taxation (e.g. income taxation) are costly, business
stealing can reduce the gains from deregulation. When asymmetric information is added to the
picture, yardstick competition gives a new value to competition. The negative impact of business
stealing is mitigated because the presence of a competitor allows to reduce the burden of the
information rent. The importance of the asymmetry of information and the tightness of the cash
constraint of the government are empirical issues. Assessing the relevance of the two can help
governments to choose the optimal industry regulation. In the last section of the paper, we show
that the welfare gains associated to liberalization under incomplete regulation are robust. For
large values of the cost of public funds, incomplete regulation may even dominate full regulation of
duopoly. Developing countries are typically characterized by tighten budget constraints. Partial
liberalization could be a response to their peculiar problems, conciliating some form of publicly
managed provision with the advantage of shifting part of the ￿xed investment and accountability
for market results on the private sector. One possible drawback of partial deregulation is that
excess entry occurs. Our analysis in this sense con￿rms the importance of entry regulation in
increasing returns to scale industries.
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21Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1:
The problem is given in 3. When the non-negativity constraints (5) and (6) are not binding, the
solution is given by the ￿rst order condition @WSI
@q1 = 0. Rearranging this condition we obtain
the pricing rule associated with region D (no shut down case). If the non-negative constraint
(5) is binding, then q1 = 0 and ￿rm 2 acts as a monopoly. Then, by de￿nition, ￿rm 2 produces
its monopoly quantity de￿ned as qM
2 , which induces a price equal P(qM
2 ) (region M2). If the
non-negative constraint (6) is binding, there is a monopoly with ￿rm 1. There are two di￿erent
cases. If P(qM
1 ) < 2, then r2(qM







= 0. Then, the second best solution
is equivalent to the case of regulated monopoly, namely qM
1 associated with price P(qM
1 ) (region
M). If P(qM
1 )  2, @r2=@q1 > 0 and (6) can be binding if and only if P(Q) = 2 (region M1).
Linear Demand:
Replacing S(Q) = Q  
Q2
2 and q2 = Max

0; 1
2(1   q1   2)

in the social welfare function and









   2(2 + 3) + 21(1 + )
1 + 4
P(QD;SI) =













To make a comparison with the case of regulated monopoly we derive the optimal price and









 + 1(1 + )
1 + 2
From these expressions we obtain the results in Proposition 2.
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 3:
The regulator maximizes the expected welfare (11), taking into account (10) and (4) The solution
is obtained by the ￿rst order condition with respect to q1, when this gives a positive quantity
22(i.e. q1  0 not binding). If q1 = 0, the expected price is given by the expected monopoly price
of the competitor. This characterization of the expected price is summarized in Proposition 3.
Linear Demand:






(1   q1   2)

Notice that q2 = 0 whenever 2  1   q1. The optimal q1 is obtained considering separately the
two cases 1 in [0; 1
2] or 1 in [1
2;1]. For any of the two cases, we have to consider the possibility
that 1   q1  1
2 and 1   q1  1
2. We have thus four possible cases:
Case 1: Consider ￿rst 1 in [0; 1
2] and [1   q1  1
2] (i.e. q1  1

















q1 + q2  
(q1 + q2)2
2
+ (1   q1   q2)q1   (1 + )1q1   2q2   1q1

2 d2




1 + 3(1 + )   31(1 + 2)2
3(1 + 2)
Case 2: Consider now 1 in [0; 1
2] and q1 is such that [1 q1 > 1
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(q1 + q2)2
2
+ (1   q1   q2)q1   (1 + )1q1   2q2   1q1

2 d2
The ￿rst order condition gives:
q1 =
7 + 10   161(1 + 2)
4(1 + 4)
Case 3: Take 1 in [1
2;1] and q1 such that [1   q1  1











+ (1   q1)q1   (1 + )1q1   1q1

2 d2
The ￿rst order condition gives:
q1 =
2 + 3   21(1 + 2)
2(1 + 2)
Case 4: Take 1 in [1
2;1] and q1 such that [1   q1 > 1


















q1 + q2  
(q1 + q2)2
2
+ (1   q1   q2)q1   (1 + )1q1   2q2   1q1

2 d2
23The ￿rst order condition gives:
q1 =
( 1   4 + 2
p
10 + 38 + 372   121(1 + 2)2
6(1 + 2)
Checking for the second order condition an controlling for the fact that any quantity has to





> > > > > <








16(1+2)  1  7+10
16(1+2);
0; 7+10
16(1+2)  1  1
2 or 13+22











> > > > > > > <

















16(1+2)  1  1
2 or 13+22










2 < 1  13+22
16(1+2).
Appendix 3
All the results of Propositions 4-7 require to compute expectations with respect to 1 and 2.
Under both symmetric and asymmetric information, we assume that the two parameters are dis-
tributed as in Assumption 5. Then, all expectations are obtained integrating across the di￿erent
intervals characterized in Proposition 1 and 3. Using the quantities computed in Appendix 1,
we can derive the explicit expressions for the di￿erent regions.











;1] s.t. 1 












2(1 + 2)   
1 + 
 1 












2(2 + 3)   
2(1 + )
 1 








] (1;2) 2 [
1
2
;1] s.t. 1 









] s.t. 1 








;1] s.t. 1 
42(7 + 16)   122





















42(7 + 16)   122






















The thresholds kSI, kAI, kSI
2 , kAI
2 and the threshold value of Proposition 7 are obtained as
analytical functions of  integrating above these intervals of realizations of 1 and 2. The study
of the behavior of these functions gives all the results described in Proposition 4-7 (more details
are available on request).
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